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Abstract
The term wireless sensor network is applied broadly to a range of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent networking envi-
ronments. On the other hand there exists a substantial body of research on key establishment in wireless
sensor networks, much of which does not pay heed to the variety of diﬀerent application requirements. We
set out a simple framework for classifying wireless sensor networks in terms of those properties that directly
inﬂuence key distribution requirements. We ﬁt a number of existing schemes within this framework and use
this process to identify areas which require further attention from key management architects.
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1 Introduction
While the precise properties of wireless sensor networks vary considerably, it is gen-
erally accepted that they typically consist of small, inexpensive, battery-powered
sensing devices ﬁtted with wireless transmitters, which can be spatially scattered
to form an ad hoc network. While sensors have the ability to communicate through
wireless channels, their energy, computational power and memory are constrained.
Sensor networks have been proposed for a wide range of diﬀerent applications, in-
cluding disaster relief operations, seismic data collection, wildlife monitoring and
military intelligence gathering. Sensors are distributed around the application en-
vironment and then attempt to set up a network in order to exchange and forward
data.
The wireless nature of sensor communication makes traﬃc highly vulnerable,
hence the desire for cryptographic security services. The highly constrained nature
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of sensors favours the use of symmetric cryptography, hence we restrict the survey
aspect of this paper to symmetric schemes.
Sensor networks typically lack infrastructure and sensors typically have limited
computational ability. Hence key predistribution is the favoured basis for key es-
tablishment, with keying material stored in sensor memory prior to deployment. A
comprehensive classiﬁcation survey of schemes prior to March 2005 is given in [2].
This classiﬁcation, however, focuses on the mathematical construction techniques
employed, rather than on the properties of the networks for which the schemes are
to be applied.
It is clear from the survey of sensor network applications in [34] that the term
wireless sensor network is used to describe a variety of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent network
environments. The multidimensional design space proposed in [34] classiﬁes estab-
lished sensor networks in terms of physical and logical diﬀerences. This is a useful
general taxonomy, but it does not clearly deﬁne the diﬀerent application needs with
respect to key establishment. In [37] Van der Merwe et al. survey key management
in mobile ad hoc networks; they give the view that “the key predistribution ﬁeld for
sensor networks currently requires a comprehensive analysis of the existing schemes
in terms of security, performance, and implementation practicality.” [37]
The intention of this paper is to establish a framework for classifying diﬀerent
sensor network environments from the point of view of key establishment require-
ments. Fitting existing schemes within this framework permits a clearer compari-
son of schemes appropriate for particular network environments. Furthermore, this
framework enables the identiﬁcation of application environments to which inade-
quate attention has been paid in the literature.
In the next section we specify the networks that fall within the scope of this
paper and give a brief overview of key establishment for such networks, together with
issues aﬀecting it. In Section 3 we discuss properties of sensor networks that aﬀect
the key distribution requirements and use these properties to provide a framework
for studying key establishment in sensor networks. We subsequently discuss how
particular schemes fall within this framework in Section 4 and highlight some topics
requiring further research attention.
2 Key establishment for wireless sensor networks
Our framework is primarily designed to encompass key establishment schemes based
on key predistribution. Thus we assume that sensors have keying material stored
in their memories before deployment by a trusted authority, but in general have
no further access to this trusted authority after deployment. In particular, schemes
relying on the presence of a base station that can always communicate securely with
the sensors fall outside the scope of this survey, as do schemes dependent on public-
key techniques. Note that relying on key predistribution does not preclude sensors
themselves acting as local distributors of keying material and enabling further key
establishment through sensor-to-sensor communication.
We assume that the network is vulnerable to attack by an adversary who has
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the ability to compromise any given node and extract any keys or other secret
data stored in its memory, and to intercept any wireless communication within the
network. Such an adversary is termed a global passive adversary by Anderson et
al. [1]. The literature contains examples of schemes based on other attack models,
such as [1,13], however in this study we conﬁne ourselves to schemes based on the
global passive adversary model.
Let S be the set of sensors in our network. The ideal communication structure
C is the collection of subsets of S for whom we (ideally) wish to establish common
(group) keys. For any A ∈ C we use kA to denote the common key for the subset of
sensors A. The choice of the term ideal is deliberate because:
(i) In many wireless sensor network applications there is a degree of lack of control
over the sensor network that is actually established, since the precise location
of sensor deployment may not be controllable, and sensors may even be mobile.
(ii) Groups of sensors may be unable to communicate due to the distance between
them exceeding their communication range, or sensors becoming absent from
the network due to battery failure, adversarial attack etc.
(iii) It may be more eﬃcient to predistribute keys in such a way that the not
every group of sensors in C shares a key, and rely on a limited amount of key
agreement between deployed sensors to establish the remaining group keys.
There is thus often a discrepancy between the network communication structure C∗,
which describes the groups of sensors who share predistributed keys, and the ideal
communication structure, which describes the groups of sensors that we ultimately
may want to share a common key. It is acceptable to use sensor-to-sensor com-
munication to bridge any gaps between these two communication structures since
sensor networks are designed to be co-operative networks that can robustly handle
absences of desirable links through adaptable routing.
3 Application-oriented key establishment framework
In this section we describe our simple framework for studying key establishment
within the wide range of diﬀerent sensor network environments. We split this frame-
work into three parts:
(i) Categories of sensor networks that signiﬁcantly aﬀect key establishment design.
(ii) Relevant variable parameters that determine instances within each of the above
deﬁned categories.
(iii) Performance indicators that can be used to assess speciﬁc key establishment
schemes.
3.1 Categories of sensor networks
The following three aspects of sensor networks signiﬁcantly aﬀect key establishment
design. Solutions proposed for one particular set of categories are unlikely to be
readily applicable for another set of categories.
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(i) Homogeneity: The relative capabilities of diﬀerent sensors. Sensor networks
tend to fall into one of two classes:
(a) Homogeneous: all sensors have the same capabilities.
(b) Hierarchical : there is a natural hierarchy of sensors with respect to their ca-
pabilities (with fewer sensors at higher, more “powerful” levels). The most
common hierarchical networks are two-level, where there are two classes of
sensor. Note that “powerful” could relate to issues such as amount of key
storage, computational capability or degree of mobility.
(ii) Deployment location control: The degree of control over sensor locations
on deployment. Five classes of sensor network can be identiﬁed:
(a) Fixed, full control : the precise location of sensors is known before de-
ployment. Applications where sensors may then undertake strictly limited
mobility (for example monitoring points on a glacier) can be placed within
this class for the purposes of key management.
(b) Fixed, partial control : some information about the location of sensors is
known before deployment. This class includes applications where clusters
of sensors are dropped from the air over ﬁxed locations.
(c) Fixed, no control : the location of sensors cannot be predicted before de-
ployment. This class includes applications where sensors are randomly
scattered over a monitoring area.
(d) Locally mobile: sensors are mobile within a controlled locality. In this class,
sensors can be assumed to be free to move to any location within a strictly
deﬁned local area, but cannot stray out of this area.
(e) Fully mobile: sensors are mobile. In this class, sensors are free to move
anywhere within the network environment.
(iii) Nature of ideal communication structure: The desired ideal communi-
cation structure of the sensor network. This can consists of any collection of
groups of sensors. In the case of homogenous sensor networks, three important
classes of ideal communication structure are:
(a) t-complete: all subsets of sensors of size t. By far the most common com-
munication structure within this class is pairwise complete (2-complete).
This class of communication structure is particularly appropriate in the
case of networks with no control over deployment location.
(b) Locally t-complete: all local subsets of sensor of size t, where the precise
notion of local varies depending on the context, but generally refers to
sensors who are neighbours of one another in some sense. Again the most
common communication structure is pairwise locally complete, which arises
in applications where the most commonly required communication ﬂow is
between a (mobile) external sink and any sensor. In this case we need to
construct paths from sensors to the mobile sink, hence the need for neigh-
bouring sensors to be able to share key associations. Such a communication
structure can only be deﬁned when there is at least partial knowledge of
sensor deployment location.
(c) Regionally t-complete: all subsets of sensors of size t within a speciﬁed
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region. This diﬀers from locally t-complete in that sensors who belong
to the same “region” (but are not necessarily neighbours) are required
to share key associations. This type of communication structure might be
employed, for example, in the case of a network with locally mobile sensors.
In heterogeneous networks, the more powerful sensors normally bear the ma-
jority of the communication burden. The ideal communication structure in
such networks tends to depend on the nature of the hierarchy. For example,
in the backhaul model [35] there are two levels and the ideal communication
structure consists of:
• all pairs of top-level sensors;
• pairs of (top-level, bottom-level) sensors, such that each bottom-level sensor
appears in precisely one pair.
3.2 Variable sensor network parameters
Having identiﬁed which set of categories in Section 3.1 matches a particular sensor
network application, the following parameters of sensor networks deﬁne particular
instances of key establishment solutions. By this we mean that while it is often
possible to deﬁne a generic key establishment technique based on the ﬁrst categori-
sation, the following parameters tend to form variables that can be set to deﬁne a
speciﬁc scheme.
• Storage: The storage capability of a sensor. This is perhaps the most signiﬁcant
parameter in terms of its direct limiting eﬀect on key establishment scheme design.
• Energy: The energy available for a sensor to conduct computations and com-
munications. It is generally considered that the energy requirements for commu-
nication far outweigh those of computation.
• Range: The communication range over which a sensor can contact other sensors.
This is also related to the energy capability since greater communication ranges
tend to consume more power. Note that a sensor that has a certain communi-
cation range might choose not to use the full range capability, as a power saving
measure.
We note that these variable parameters tend to be closely related. For example, in
a two-level heterogenous sensor network it is likely that top-level sensors will have
larger storage, more power and greater range. However, particular applications may
constrain some of these variable parameters more than others.
3.3 Performance indicators
The last part of the framework identiﬁes quantities that can be used to compare
the performance of key establishment schemes. These allow two key establishment
schemes for the same sensor network category set and parameter settings to be
directly compared.
• Connectivity: This is a measure of how closely the network communication
structure matches the ideal communication structure.
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• Scalability: This measures the feasibility of use of the scheme with large network
sizes. It essentially reﬂects the storage requirements relative to the number of
nodes in the network.
• Resilience: This indicates the proportion of established keys that become com-
promised once the adversary has access to the secret data from a small proportion
of the nodes.
• Computation/Communication overheads: These measure the precise costs
of a particular solution.
While the above performance indicators are broadly adopted in the literature, there
appears to be a notable lack of universally-accepted performance measures for in-
terpreting them. Most published schemes contain parameters that can be chosen
to permit a tradeoﬀ between these quantities, although this is not always expressed
directly in numeric terms.
4 Categorising existing key establishment schemes
In Section 3 we isolated categories of sensor networks that will require very diﬀerent
key establishment solutions. We now match a number of published key establish-
ment schemes to part of this framework, in order to summarise what has been
achieved in the literature and highlight areas that remain open for further investi-
gation.
2-compl/ locally 2-compl/ regionally 2-compl/ hierarchical-
t-compl locally t-compl regionally t-compl backhaul
ﬁxed,
full control
ﬁxed, [28]/ [10][11][12][38]
partial control [9][14][21][28]/[18]
ﬁxed, [8][17][19][20] [35]
no control [32][39][33]
[3][4][23][24][25]
[5][6][7]
[10][11][12][15]
[27][29][31][30]
Fig. 1. Key establishment schemes within the framework
In Figure 1 we have tabulated published schemes within our framework in terms
of the type of network that they are designed to support. We now consider in
more detail the schemes appearing in the various categories, before discussing open
problems that arise from the examination of this categorisation.
4.1 2-Complete schemes with no location control
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that most of the key predistribution literature ad-
dresses the problem of seeking a 2-complete key predistribution scheme for a net-
work with ﬁxed sensors, but no control over sensor location. It appears that schemes
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of this category form the default key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor net-
works, when the wireless sensor network environment for which a solution is being
proposed is not clearly articulated. Within this category it is possible to identify
several basic approaches to the design of key predistribution schemes. Probablistic
schemes include Eschenauer and Gligor’s seminal scheme [17] in which each node
is assigned a ﬁxed number m of keys drawn without replacement from a pool of K
keys. A small value of K implies that the scheme will have good connectivity, as it
increases the probability that two nodes will share a common key, but the resilience
is low, as each key is likely to be stored in a signiﬁcant proportion of the nodes, thus
exposure of a key may disrupt a large proportion of network communication. In-
creasing K improves the resilience, at the cost of decreasing connectivity. Schemes
that build on this basic method include [8][19][20][32][39][33].
Combinatorial schemes make use of the properties of combinatorial designs (or
related structures such as strongly regular graphs) in a deterministic manner. In
these schemes the choice of the underlying combinatorial object determines the ﬁnal
performance of the scheme. For example, in [25] Lee and Stinson propose schemes
based on transversal designs, and describe a family of such designs parameterised
by quantities m, a prime power, and k where 2 ≤ k ≤ m. In their schemes nodes
are required to store k keys, and two nodes have a probability k
m+1 of sharing a
key; such schemes can support m2 nodes. Increasing the value of m, for instance,
would improve the scalability of the scheme, although the connectivity would suf-
fer a corresponding decrease. Other schemes based on combinatorial objects can
be found in [3][4][23][24][25]. Closely related are the so-called hybrid schemes, in
which probabilistic elements are added to an underlying combinatorial structure in
order achieve greater ﬂexibility in some of the parameters involved, while hopefully
keeping many of the desirable properties of the object in question. Such techniques
are used in [3][5][6][7].
Another approach that is frequently employed is the use of threshold-based tech-
niques. Keying material is predistributed to subsets of nodes such that any two
nodes in a subset can establish a common key, and there is some threshold value t
whereby an adversary compromising fewer than t nodes gets no information about
keys shared by other nodes, but an adversary compromising t or more nodes can
compute all keys shared by nodes within the subset. Such schemes are usually in-
stantiated through the use of matrices [15] or polynomials [10][11][12][27][29][31][30].
Probabilistic techniques are frequently used to decide the subsets to which each node
belongs (essentially the key pool is replaced by a pool of matrices/polynomials).
Having higher thresholds, or using a greater number of subsets will increase the
resilience of a scheme, but will require greater node storage.
The category of 2-complete schemes without location control can thus be said to
be well understood, at least in the pairwise case, in that a range of solutions are avail-
able for a variety of parameter choices. Less is known about t-wise communication
structures, although in some cases these will form straightforward generalisations.
K.M. Martin, M. Paterson / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 192 (2008) 31–41 37
4.2 Locally 2-complete schemes
In [28] Liu and Ning describe a Closest-Pairwise scheme for a locally 2-complete
communication structure. In this scheme each node is preloaded with distinct pair-
wise keys shared with the c nodes that are expected to be closest to it after deploy-
ment. The fact that keys are only ever shared between two users implies, however,
that the number of local nodes with which a given node can communicate securely
is limited directly by the number of keys it can store.
4.3 Regionally 2-complete schemes
The regionally 2-complete schemes appearing in the literature are exten-
sions of either probabilistic schemes ([14][21][9][18]) or threshold-based schemes
([10][11][12][38]). In the probabilistic case, separate key pools are used for distinct
(although possibly overlapping) regions, and nodes are assigned keys from the pools
of each region in which they are contained. Similarly, in the threshold case there
is a particular matrix/polynomial associated with each region, and nodes receive
keying material corresponding to the regions in which they lie. These schemes diﬀer
predominantly in their choice of regions; for instance, in [10,11,12] the regions are
based on the cells of a hexagonal grid, whereas in [38] they are based on a triangular
grid and in the polynomial-based scheme of [28] a square grid is employed.
4.4 Hierarchical schemes
The scheme of Traynor et al. [35] can be regarded as a hierarchical version of the
probabilistic schemes discussed above. In this case the nodes store varying numbers
of keys from the key pool according to their level in the hierarchy.
4.5 Future directions
The above classiﬁcation of the schemes appearing in the literature suggests four
areas for further work that emerge from this review:
(i) In many applications there is a degree of control over sensor location. Knowl-
edge of the network topology and location of sensors is likely to be exploitable
in the design of key establishment schemes that are more eﬃcient than those
deﬁned for the default scenario. Relatively little research has been done on
such schemes. In the case of schemes with partial control over sensor location,
attention has focused mainly on providing regionally 2-complete solutions, in
the cases where nodes are distributed uniformly [18,10,11,12,38] or the node
location is based around a square grid [15]. This leaves open the problem of
ﬁnding eﬃcient solutions for other network topologies.
(ii) The majority of applications have no apparent need for a pairwise ideal com-
munication structure. A signiﬁcant number of applications involved a mobile
sink communicating with individual sensors. When there is no control of sensor
location then designing schemes for pairwise ideal communication structures
seems the only option. However, since applications of this type only really
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need local communication between sensors in order to securely relay informa-
tion, partial control over sensor location should lead to more eﬃcient schemes.
There is thus considerable scope for the design of new locally complete schemes.
(iii) Most of the literature dealing with key management in heterogeneous sensor
networks relies on the presence of a base station that can communicate directly
with sensors e.g. [36,22]. It would be interesting, however, to see more solutions
in the case of a network that has sensors of diﬀering capabilities without access
to a base station, as in [35]. In particular there is a lack of solutions in the
case of a hierarchical networks with partial knowledge of sensor location.
(iv) Most schemes in the literature propose solutions for static sensor deployment.
Intriguingly a signiﬁcant number of the applications of deployed schemes in [34]
involve mobile sensors, for which few dedicated schemes have been designed.
5 Conclusion
There is no single, precise, deﬁnition of a wireless sensor network. As a result this
term is applied to a wide family of networking environments that support a range
of applications. This ambiguity has important implications for the design of key
establishment schemes.
We have proposed a simple framework that can be used to deﬁne and compare
key establishment schemes for wireless sensor networks. In particular this framework
is designed to isolate the important categories that make a key establishment scheme
suitable for a particular type of sensor network. Our consideration of existing
schemes with respect to this framework suggests that much of the current research
has a focus that does not necessarily match application requirements. In particular,
the default scenario of static, homogeneous sensors whose deployment location is
completely uncontrolled does not apply as widely as suggested. As a result we have
identiﬁed the need for further investigation of key establishment schemes under
slightly diﬀerent assumptions.
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